

Russian Pan-Slavism and its Concept of Europe

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Introduction

The end of the 18th century may be regarded as the end of old Europe from several aspects. Firstly, in terms of the system of international relations Europe gave up the Peace of Westphalia as the model of regional order. The time of turbulence between 1789 and 1815 led to another system, which would last a century. Secondly, from the perspective of internal political systems, European states began a great transformation of traditional absolute monarchies, which were replaced hastily or gradually by a great variety of a radical Jacobin republic of terror to constitutional monarchy. Finally, Europe changed its ideological structure: religion was not put aside but it was no longer worth to become a reason for war. The kings, queens, and emperors would not be equivalents to the Japanese monarch any more: they are comprehended now as officials who represent the Nation.

The change that took place during and after the Revolution turned out to be both essential and paradoxical at the same time. The conservative, rightist camp worshipping the holiness of the church, the throne and the aristocracy, unexpectedly shook the hands of the worshippers of *La Nation*, the previous bone of contention. The Nation, which originally replaced the monarch in the position of the Sovereign thus becoming the absolute subject of all the state's policies after a time began to enjoy common language with the old rightists. In this way, nationalism, the child of a pre-romantic rebellion which stemmed from the anti-conservative spirit, became a new, totally deconstructed standard of rightism. The real icebreaker between the ideologists of sacral Monarchy and the worshippers of *La Nation* was (as usual) the common enemy, this time embodied in liberalism. After the collapse of the *ancient régime* the animalistic drive to seek the Savior on Earth did not allow many

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to put up with the trivial ideology of freedom¹, and the Nation as a collective idol replaced the old altar.

European nationalism took various shapes and generally proceeded toward aggressive and primitive chauvinism in the form of tribal selfishness or racism. However, the nationalist thought faced various problems concerning not only the proper level of radicalism but also another conceptual challenge which lay in the very subject of nationalistic concerns. In other words, the notion of *La Nation* had to be determined, and it was clear that it in the European reality of the “age of steam” the semantic field of it might not be always narrow. The subject and object of political actions was bigger or smaller and referred to a local, regional or continental formula which denoted a tribal community of common ancestors (we, the Aryans), a political whole (we, the citizens of the Republic) or a community of common values (we, the *Kulturträger*).

One of the conceptually most developed forms of response to these dilemmas can be observed in the phenomenon of the Pan-Movements, which were accurately defined by Louis L. Snyder as «macro-nationalisms»². The collection of those doctrines although possibly motivated by each other, is actually quite heterogenic. The diversification of the Pan-Movements stems from the great diversity of national phenomena on the one hand and from the theoretical divergence on the other: Pan-Turkism was the movement that aimed at the unification of all Turkic-speaking peoples whereas Pan-Germanism (Alldeutschtum) looked at the unification of all Germans not all Germanic tribes, etc.

This chapter is devoted to the vision of Europe in the Russian form of Pan-Slavism, which is the earliest case of Macro-Nationalisms. What must be remembered is that the insight should also take into account the existence of the opposite wind that always blew through the continental lowlands: the existence of various kinds of Pan-Europeism with the Aurelian idea of the unified Roman-oriented world, the monarchy of Charlemagne, who made his officials speak Latin, the Christian Holy Roman Empire, and the Napoleonic attempt to unify Europe under the banner of a common Code Civil.

The Prequels: Pan-Slavism in the South and West of the Slavic World

The first Pan-Slavic ideas appeared in the 16th century in the Western Balkans thanks to Catholic thinkers, mainly clergymen. The forerunner

1. Snyder is definitely right claiming that it is liberalism that “gave way to the powerful force of nationalism”. See Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 1984, p. 68.

2. *Ibid.*

of this trend was Vinko Pribojević of Venice, the author of the treatise *De origine successibusque Slavorum* (The Origin and Glory of Slavs) of 1532, where the Dalmatian intellectual developed the myth of Ilyrians. This tradition was later continued by Aleksander Komulović (1548-1608), Bartol Kašić (1575-1650), Ivan Gundulić (1589-1638), and by the most influential personality – Juraj Križanić (1618-1683) – a Croatian Catholic missionary who proposed the idea of unifying the Roman Church with the Orthodox community³ thanks to the mediation of Slavs, who were comprehended by him as a single tribe speaking several varieties of the same language and representing two basic denominations of Christianity⁴. It was Križanić who took the ideas of unity to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, where he worked in the years 1659-1676 (first in Moscow; after Jan 1661 in Tobolsk, a place of compulsory exile).

Križanić's ideas did not gain popularity in the quite insular 17th century Muscovy. However, the Napoleonic wars and the concert of powers dismantled new tensions, which brought about specific nationalistic sentiments and resentments. The Pan-Slavic idea was then reborn as one of the modern nationalisms in Central Europe. The Slavic nations constituted an essential element of such European states as Russia (the only independent predominantly Slavic country), Prussia (Poles and Lusatian Sorbs), the Ottoman Empire (Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Bosnians) and Austria with its Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croatians, Slovenes, and Serbs. Due to the fact that in the ethnic composition of the Austrian population Slavs constituted the greatest part – about 47.2% with only 23.4% of German-speaking Austrians and 19.6% Hungarians – there is no wonder why it was just Austria where the modern stage of Pan-Slavism began. Austrian Slavism was a typically Romantic concept and in a way a revolutionary idea but, on the other hand, not a very aggressive one. It was an expression of an intention to socially and culturally empower the Slavic nations in the Habsburg empire.

This Romantic version of the movement was initiated by Ján Kollár (1793-1852), a Slovak Protestant minister and Ľudovít Štúr (1815-1856), a poet and philologist born into the same nation. Štúr's writings show his deep love toward his tribe, but also some ignorance of the social and political reality within the Slavic world, especially in Russia. His main work, *The Slavs and the World of the Future* (*Das Slawentum und die Welt der Zukunft*, in Slovak: *Slovanstvo a svet budoucnosti*) was originally written in German and then

3. See his: Юрий Крижанич, Записка о мисии в Москву, Императорское общество истории и древностей Российских, Москва 1901.

4. The concept of the linguistic unity of Slavs is expressed predominantly in his study written in Tobolsk in 1666: Юрий Крижанич, Граматично изказанье об русском езику, по па Юрка Крижанича, презванием серблянина, между Купойю и Вунойю риками во уездех Биуша града, окол Дубобца, Озля и Рибника острогов, Писано в Сибири Лита 7104 (1596), Университетская типография, Москва 1859.

published in Russia in 1867, where it gained substantial popularity, while at the same time remaining congruent with the main theses of Russian Pan-Slavism. A pro-Czech version of Pan-Slavism (directed against Germanization and Hungarization) was presented by another Slovak poet and ethnographer, Pavol Jozef Šafárik (1795-1861).

Austrian Slavism, however, is associated predominantly with František Palacký (1798-1867), a Czech historian considered to be the father of the Czech national revival. As the author of the famous work on Czech history *The History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia (Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě)* he not only made his nation aware of its historical fate but also retraced its Slavic origin. A similar ideological line was represented by František Ladislav Rieger (1818-1903), who was inspired by the Polish irredentist movement. In 1848 Palacký co-organized the famous First Slavic Congress in Prague, where all the weaknesses and naivety of the Austrian Slavism were revealed: having dreamed about the unity of the tongue, the organizers finally had to resort to German as the only language that was understood by the majority of participants.

What is especially interesting is that most of the activists mentioned above were Protestants within a generally Catholic nation. This was in a way symbolic if one considers the strictly Catholic character of the Austrian dynasty and of both leading nations in the empire: the German-speaking Austrians and Hungarians. Hans Kohn also realized some other important features of Central European Pan-Slavism: apart from the universalist Slavic revival in Austria we can observe some internal Pan-Movements such as Pan-Serbian or Pan-Polish, both using Pan-Slavic slogans. Moreover, some non-Slavic publicists in Europe such as Giuseppe Mazzini resorted to Central European versions of Pan-Slavism in attempts to oppose it to aggressive imperialism in Germany and Russia. In this way some thinkers, like Joseph Edmund Jörg (1819-1901) tended to proclaim the necessity of unifying all Central European nations in the Catholic Habsburg Empire as they feared Russia's despotism and emerging Communist ideology⁵.

The Problem of a Proper Approach

The positions of particular Pan-Slavic activists in Europe could be perceived as sometimes contradictory to each other due to the very different situations, which Slavic nations were in throughout the 19th century. The Slavic aspect was a useful slogan rather than a clear axiological imperative. The particular state where the situation of the nation and its potential political interests

5. Hans Kohn, *The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe*, in «The Review of Politics», vol. 23, n. 3 (July, 1961), p. 326.

interacted or even harmonized was the Russian Empire, where the logic of the development was specific. It is generally believed that Russian Pan-Slavism, contrary to the Austrian Slavic movement was very political and aggressive consequently forming a dangerous state ideology. Petrovich stated in 1956 that ethnic Pan-Slavism was basically rooted in culture, whereas the Russian version of the doctrine aimed at the realization of imperialistic plans⁶. A similar opinion was provided by Hugh Seton-Watson in 1967. He perceived Russian pan-Slavism as an element of unfolding Russian nationalism, which ultimately manifested itself in several action such as the creation of Sergei Uvarov doctrine of education («Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality»), the liquidation of the Ukrainian intellectual circle in Kiev and the outbreak of anti-Jewish regulations. According to Seton-Watson, after 1867 (the year of the Ethnographic Exhibition in Moscow) the older Slavophil conservative ideas gave way to a new and aggressive Pan-Slavism⁷. Some researchers to defend the trend, e.g. Shirinyants and Myrikova in 2011 treated the Western narrative about Pan-Slavism as a myth which was created by Russophobic authors, with the classics of Marxism at the helm⁸.

The Early Stages of Pan-Slavism in Russia

Russian Pan-Slavism cannot be described properly without an insight into the origin of the doctrine. There are two intrinsically different sources that contributed to the mature form of Russian pan-Slavism, which exploded at the end of the 1860s. Contrary to the natural supposition that the tradition of the Croatian or Central European influence might have played an essential part in the birth of the doctrine it had much more important “native” roots in Russian political thought. First of all, Russian pan-Slavism owes much to the conservative and Romantic national tradition, which is usually labeled as “Slavophil” considerations. The conservative nativists, such as Stepan Shevyriov (1806-1864), following the Romantic German nativist trend, aimed at the appreciation of the Russian spirit among the civilizational tendencies of the modern era.

In 1841 Shevyriov provided a very important vision of Europe, which would become essential to the development of Russian Pan-Slavism and other nationalistic doctrines of 19th century Russia. He perceived Western Europe as an incoherent phenomenon with Italy and Britain as two structurally

6. Michael B. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism 1856-1870*, Columbia University Press, New York 1956, p. 51 nn.

7. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967, p. 446 nn.

8. Александр А. Ширинянц, Анна Мырикова, Русофобский миф «панславизма», in «*Moldoscopie*», 2011, n. 1 (LII), pp. 61-83.

different images of the same civilization. The Italian spirit is strictly artistic: this country with its great and dramatic political history has become a shadow of its former greatness and is only able to look back into its glorious past. Poor and backward Italy became a great artistic studio for those Europeans who chose the industrial route of development. The perfect embodiment of this style is the British Empire – a vigorous and industrious phenomenon with no apparent symptoms of instability. However, even though the Northern nations currently display stamina and vitality, Europe is dying in its spiritual sphere. This is especially visible in France where religion became a private aspect of life and the state created temples of new heathendom. The same can be said about French literature, art, and education, which present no trace of spiritual illumination and are characterized by atomization and randomness⁹.

A different situation can be observed on the Eastern bank of the Rhein. According to Shevyriov, Germany is a country where French individualism and disorder is replaced by discipline and obedience. This spirit of subordination transforms the German land into a very prosperous domain with spectacular development of art and industry. However, the German soul is cleft: under the surface of an orderly citizen one can find a dangerous, extremely individualistic and even anarchic mentality. This is reflected in German philosophy, which can be seen as the intellectual expression of the main weakness of Western style development: the separation of philosophy and religion¹⁰. The collapse of literature and culture in the West reflects the dark road to total unification, which ultimately leads to the disappearance of creative impulses¹¹.

Russia, a Slavic continuator of the European destiny does not suffer from European weaknesses: it preserved its ancient religious feelings, the awareness of the integrity of the state, and the spirit of nationality. All of these features inspire Russia to refrain from European influence and remain faithful to the patterns of Old Rus instead. These features cause Western resentment toward Russia and activate ingratitude, which can be explained only by imagining the kind of anger an old man feels towards his younger and prospectuous successor¹².

Some impulses leading to the ideas of Pan-Slavism were given by the Slavophiles, who actually did not intend to be called that way. Their writings appeared as a reaction to Russian Westernism which was presented in the 18th century by such people as Vasily Tatishchev an important historian and friend to Peter the Great and then by Alexandr Radishchev who glorified

9. Степан П. Шевырев, Взгляд Русского на современное образование Европы, published in: Русская социально-политическая мысль. Первая половина XIX века. Хрестоматия, Издательство московского университета, Москва 2011, pp. 451-463.

10. Ivi, pp. 468-475.

11. Ivi, p. 456.

12. Ivi, pp. 479-481.

the new American republic. In the 19th century Westernism found a strong representation in the thought of a brilliant philosopher – Petr Chaadaev and then was continued by influential liberals such as Timofey Granovsky or Konstantin Kavelin. Whereas the Westerners criticized Russia's historical experience and social values, the Slavophiles proclaimed the superiority of Russian history, which was associated with harmony and the voluntary acceptance of monarchy. The West was accused of glorifying conflict within society, which elevated the calamitous idea of social contract. Within the realm of Slavophile thought Russian Orthodoxy was labeled as the ideal religion of unity in freedom and contrasted to Catholicism, a denomination with unity but without freedom and Protestantism as another deviated kind of Christianity which represents freedom without unity¹³. The Slavic ideology appeared among the Slavophiles relatively late. The first Slavophile thinker who crossed the boundaries of conservative nationalism¹⁴ and entered the area of pan-movements was Yuri Samarin.

However, the first steps of modern Russian Pan-Slavism were made by another thinker – Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), who was the publisher of such conservative journals as *Moskvitianin* and *Moskovsky Vestnik*. He was generally a traditionalist and nativist, and his critical narrative about Europe resembles the one of Shevyrinov. However, there was a new element in the shape of a radical Pan-Slavist idea that appeared in his considerations during the early 1820s. He dreamed about liberating Austrian Slavs and annexing Poland's western territories which were occupied by Prussia. The main objective was to unify the Slavs to one (Russian) state. He was even ready to exchange the Baltic territories for the Polish Western provinces in an attempt to avoid non-Slavic influences in his country¹⁵. Pogodin's intellectual development inspired him to modify those ideas in the next decades. During the Crimean War he proclaimed the necessity of unifying all Slavic nations to a political conglomeration of states and liberating Constantinople, the Orthodox capital¹⁶.

What made the concept slightly complicated was that Russia itself was an occupying power which was responsible for the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Pogodin expressed understanding toward the

13. For a detailed study of the conceptual development of Slavophilism see: Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: history of a conservative utopia in nineteenth-century Russian thought*, translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975.

14. See also Joachim Diez, *Konserwatywny nacjonalizm (Conservative nationalism)*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2013, pp. 132, 373.

15. Сопр. Александр А. Ширинянец, *Русский хранитель. Политический консерватизм М.П. Погодина*, Издательство "Русский мир", Москва 2008, p. 77.

16. Михаил П. Погодин, *В июне. Настоящая война в отношении к Русской истории*, published in his: *Историко-политические письма и записки в продолжении Крымской войны. 1853-1856*, Тизенгаузен, Москва 1874, pp. 188 nn.

Polish claims but he limited his concept to the idea of liberating Prussian and Austrian Poles. However, he also realized that the Polish elite in the previous Polish Eastern provinces treated the Eastern Slavic and Orthodox peasant majority as second-class citizens. He believed that Poland should become a free country but in the ethnic rather than political sense. His opinion was that unification of all Polish territories with Russia was inevitable and that Poles would most likely accept it as they would understand that Russia was the genuine guarantee of their freedom. The reality, however, was different. Influential Polish authors such as Adam Mickiewicz or Franciszek Duchński promoted the idea of the opposition between spiritually Asian (Turan) Russia and liberal European Poland within the Slavic world. And this, in turn, would ultimately result in the development of a malignant russophobic narrative in Europe¹⁷. This kind of argumentation is congruent with the doctrine of the Polish «one-eyed apostate», Count Adam Gurowski, who gave up his patriotic sentiments in spite of playing an important part in the November Uprising of 1830. Gurowski, asking the tsar for forgiveness, proclaimed the idea that Poland had lost its chance to dominate over Slavdom by choosing Western Christianity. Therefore, only Russia can secure the interests of the Slavic nations and Poles should become faithful subjects to the Russian throne¹⁸.

The image of the European West in Pogodin's writings is somewhat unclear or even contradictory. On the one hand, the founder of Russian Pan-Slavism treated Russia and the Occident as two elements of the same civilization and there was no sense to criticize his country for the lack of Western phenomena and institutions. Russia had its own European history, including the Middle Ages, but in her own, national forms: the Kremlin instead of the Tower, the Mongol domination instead of the crisis of feudalism, the rise of absolute monarchy in the West, and Petrine reforms instead of the Reformation¹⁹. On the other hand, even in Pogodin's early writings, a clear manifestation of the belief in Russia's absolute uniqueness and the obvious strangeness of the European West can be found.

In the historical sense, European states, contrary to Old Rus (where the Scandinavian princes were summoned voluntarily), were based on the idea of conquest, which caused infinite conflicts. That is why the history of Europe developed within a tragic cause-effect chain: conquest, internal split, feudalism, cities with their third estate, hate, struggle, and the

17. Михаил П. Погодин, Польский вопрос, published in his: Статьи политические и польский вопрос (1856-1867), Типография Ф.Б. Миллера, Москва 1876, pp. 332 nn.

18. Adam Gurowski, *La Vérité sur la Russie et sur la révolte des provinces Polonaises*, Paris, Delaunay 1834.

19. Михаил П. Погодин, За русскую старину, published in: Александр А. Ширинянц, Русский хранитель. Политический консерватизм М.П. Погодина, Москва, Издательство "Русский мир" 2008, p. 343 nn.

liberation of cities Pogodin understood as the first tragedy of the European trilogy. Legal codes, the struggle of the middle class and the revolution – these together formed the second one. Finally, the newest legislation and the struggle of the lower classes lead to the third European tragedy, which did not concern Russia²⁰. Pogodin also realized the important social differences between Europe and Russia. The striking feature of the European West is the existence of the third estate, which fought against the privileges of aristocracy, and emphasized the importance of the middle class dwellings – cities, which in Europe, contrary to Russia, created their own world. The Western societies, according to Pogodin, suffer from irritability, which makes them different from the quiet and modest Russian people. In the same way Russian Orthodoxy, which follows the Byzantine rule of the subordination of the clergy to the emperor, is a religion of peace and humility- whereas the Western church actively participated in the struggle for power. Finally, the process of education in Western Europe was somewhat odd as the conquerors (Germanic and Celtic tribes) were illuminated by the conquered Roman civilization whereas in the Old Rus the Slavs received education from the ruling Norsemen who had finally accepted Christianity²¹.

Pogodin's general opinion regarding Europe was quite critical and followed the pattern drawn by Shevyriov: he believed that no matter how developed the European institutions were in the 19th century, the Western Golden Age had already been *passé* for a long time²². Pogodin's concept of Europe thereby fit with a long chain of Russian concepts of Europe as a rotten civilization, which would be sooner or later replaced by young and vigorous Russia in the global development of humanity.

Danilevsky and His Pan-Slavic Opus Magnum

The same trait can be traced in the theory of another classical representative of Pan-Slavism, Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822-1885)- a biologist, economist and official in the imperial ministry of the exchequer. His most popular book, *Russia and Europe* (first published in the form of articles in the journal *Zaria* in the years 1868-69) became not only the Bible of Pan-Slav ideas but also a handbook about multucivilizational world order.

20. Михаил П. Погодин, Исследования, замечания и лекции о русской истории, Москва, Императорское Московское общество истории и древностей российских 1846, vol. 3, p. 495.

21. Сопр. Анна В. Почивалова, Параллели исторического развития России и стран западной Европы в трудах М.П. Погодина, Вестник МГОУ, 2009, n. 2, pp. 21-26.

22. Михаил Погодин, Письма и статьи о политике России в отношении славянских народов и западной Европы, Paris, A. Franck 1860, pp. 13-14

Danilevsky rejected the idea of humanity as an integral whole: the “human race” in his writings is rather a zoological notion; in the spiritual dimension of the world’s history it is a composition of several separate and linguistically coherent “cultural-historical types” which are undergoing a process of evolution. They begin with a longitudinal “ethnographic” stage and become internally stronger and prolific to reach the moment of statehood and then the “period of civilization”, which is a relatively short time in history when a cultural-historical type enjoys the peak of development with its best art, literature, philosophy, science or industry. Following this, a long process of decline usually begins and leads to the desintegration of the type, which loses its original stamina²³.

Danilevsky’s cultural-historical types, described in terms of biological organisms, are impenetrable to each other and therefore each of them has its own, integral history. Civilizational crossbreeding is generally impossible since the fruits of a hybrid will always be unfortunate and infertile like a mule. That is why the nations of the Slavic cultural-historical type cannot grow and develop by trying to absorb essential features of a different, especially the Romano-Germanic European type²⁴. The latter is characterized in Danilevsky’s work as a very significant one in the world’s history. However, similarly to the opinions presented by Shevyriov and Pogodin, Danilevsky supposed that Europe is already undergoing the phase of decline after the brilliant times between the 16th and 18th century²⁵.

Trying to understand the root of the Romano-Germanic type, Danilevsky pointed at the hyperbolization of individuality, which was also emphasized by Pogodin or the classics of Slavophilism such as Konstantin Aksakov and Alexei Khomiakov. The Germanic selfishness has led to ruthless violence, which is actually an extreme manifestation of individualism. The source of this lies not in philosophy or religion but rather but in the features of European “ethnographic material”. Religious intolerance which has led to the atrocities of wars was later given up to be soon replaced by colonial conquest and officially sanctioned slavery²⁶. That is why Danilevsky, trying to avoid Western or Turkish domination over the Slavic nations proposed to liberate all Austrian, Prussian and Ottoman Slavs and create a confederated Pan-Slav Union with the capital in Constantinople²⁷.

23. Николай Я. Данилевский, *Россия и Европа. Взгляд на культурные и политические отношения славянского мира к германо-романскому*, Санкт Петербург, Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета 1995, pp. 90 nn.

24. Ivi, p. 82.

25. Ivi, p. 144.

26. Ivi, p. 150 nn.

27. Comp. Robert MacMaster, *Danilevsky. A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher*, Mass., Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1967.

The Continuator

The development of the Pan-Slavic doctrine was continued by several thinkers, including Yuri Samarin, Ivan Aksakov, Rostislav Fadeev, Vladimir Cherkassky, Mikhail Chernyaev, Mikhail Skobelev. Their remarks on Europe, however, did not represent any original concepts. For instance, Samarin in the same way as the earlier Slavophiles perceived Western European Catholicism as a denomination that broke up with the universal church. In that way, it allowed the local Roman principles of cultural upbringing to dominate over the universal mission²⁸.

Several European states were accused by Samarin of ingratitude toward Russia and double-dealing. A special attention was devoted to Austria, which is an equivalent of the Ottoman Empire, where a privileged minority repressed a great variety of nations (mainly Orthodox Slavs). The only difference between both empires lies in the pilgrimage target: Rome instead of Mecca²⁹. A good example of the European attitude towards Russia is the willingness to partition it in revenge for partitioning Poland. This country, however, is treated by the West as a Latin knife put into the body of Slavdom³⁰. Similar suggestions are present in the writings of Ivan Aksakov, who claims that Western Europe actively cooperates with the Muslim world to annihilate Russia³¹.

Conclusions

A general insight into the writings of Russian Pan-Slavists allows for the distinguishing of a moderate list of features which are attributed to the European civilization. Firstly, we observed a progression from the conviction that Russia and its Slavic allies are no less important members of the European family than France, Britain or Austria, towards an aggressive hostility and rejection – Europe finally became a different and hostile world because of two different reasons: the religious principle (Orthodoxy vs Catholicism or Protestantism) and ethnicity (the peaceful and humble mentality of the Slavic tribe vs the Romano-Germanic irreducible individualism ultimately leading to unjustified military aggression and slavery). Secondly, most of the Pan-Slavic writers believed that the root of

28. Юрий Самарин, Русская православная цивилизация и Запад, in his: Православие и народность, Москва, Институт русской цивилизации 2008, p. 128.

29. Ivi, p. 294.

30. Ivi, pp. 341-342.

31. Иван Аксаков, Наше знамя – русская народность, Москва, Институт русской цивилизации 2008, p. 530.

the Western European statehood lies in conflict and conquest, which causes internal instability and the need for political guarantees. Thirdly, some Pan-Slavists (especially the younger generation) have accused European states of betrayal: they are ready to cooperate with a Muslim empire to fight Orthodox Russia. Last, but not least – the European civilization is perceived as a rotten organism, a dying civilization which will sooner or later yield to the light from the East.